Talks

Invited & Peer-reviewed

  • New Directions in the Philosophy of Emotion, University of Manchester, Manchester, ‘The New LeDoux: Survival Circuits and the Surplus Meaning of Fear’ (2019).
  • The Australasian Association of Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, ‘Does Modularity Undermine the Pro-Emotion Consensus?’ (2018).
  • Frank Jackson, Rudolf-Carnap Lectures, University of Bochum, Bochum, ‘Why the Canberra Plan Won’t Help You Do Serious Metaphysics’ (2017).
  • Feeling Reasons Conference, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, ‘When Emotions Misfire: Encapsulation as an Explanation of Irrational Emotions’ (2017).

 

 

  • The Spanish Society for Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Oviedo, Oviedo, ‘The Cognitive Impenetrability of Recalcitrant Emotions’ (2016).
  • Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, ‘The Cognitive Impenetrability of Recalcitrant Emotions’ (2016).
  • European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, ‘The Cognitive Penetrability of Colour Experience’ (2016).
  • Brazilian Society for Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Campinas, Campinas, ‘The Cognitive Penetrability of Colour Experience’ (2016).
  • Mind Network, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, ‘The Theory-Ladenness of Recalcitrant Emotions’ (2016). [w A. Grzankowski]
  • Interactivist Summer Institute, Bilkent University, Ankara, ‘A “Daoist” Account of Consciousness’ (2015).
  • Philosophy Unbound, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, ‘Jackson’s Conceptual Analysis & the Problem of Conceptual Change’ (2014).
  • A Frontier for the Philosophy of Time Conference, Kyoto University, Kyoto, ‘A Conditional Analysis of Time’ (2013).
  • The American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, San Diego, ‘The Shared Aesthetic’ (2013).
  • The Philosophies of Philosophy Conference, University College Dublin, Dublin, ‘Conditional qua Conceptual Analysis’ (2013).
  • Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, Perth, ‘Can Representationalists Save Qualia Without Positing Ontological Extras?’ (2012)
  • Practical Philosophy Research Seminar, The University of Kyoto, Kyoto, ‘Can Representationalists Save Qualia Without Positing Ontological Extras?’ (2012)
  • The Northwest Philosophy Conference, Lewis and Clark College, Portland, ‘A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies’ (2012).

Misc.

  • Philosophy Seminar, Hong Kong University, Hong Kong ‘Conceptual Instability & the New Epistemic Possibility’ (2013).
  • Philosophy Seminar, The University of Otago, Dunedin ‘Ramseyan Humility about Qualia’ (2013).
  • The Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, ‘Conditional qua Conceptual Analysis’ (2012).
  • Current Projects Seminar, The Centre for Time, The University of Sydney, Sydney, ‘A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism’ (2012)
  • Philosophy Society Seminar, The Australian National University (RSSS), Canberra, ‘Conditional Concepts and Conceiving On the Tea Balcony’ (2012).
  • Current Projects Seminar, The Centre for Time, The University of Sydney, Sydney, ‘An Analysis of Conditional Concepts’ (2011).
  • The Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, The University of Otago, ‘A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies’ (2011).
  • The Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, ‘Grounding Intrinsicality’ (2010).
  • Philosophy Society Seminar, The Australian National University (RSSS), Canberra, ‘Pleading Ignorance In Response to Experiential Primitivism’ (2010).